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Does democracy lead to the creation of too many municipalities?  We analyze this issue 
within the context of the Alesina and Spolare (1996) model where the quality of 
municipal services deteriorates with the distance from the center of a municipality. 
Individuals can vote in a referendum to split an existing municipality.  We show that 
social welfare will decline when municipalities are split if the level of the public service, 
as chosen by the median voter, is lower in the new smaller municipalities.  In general, the 






This paper was originally prepared for the World Bank as part of a background report 
providing a conceptual framework for the reform of intergovernmental transfers in Brazil.  
I would like to thank Fernando Blanco for his comments on an earlier draft.  The usual 
disclaimer applies.   1
1.  Introduction 
Between 1982 and 2007, the number of municipalities in Brazil increased by 41 
percent.
1  The increase in the number of municipalities has been attributed to the 
incentives created by the intergovernmental transfer system because per capita transfers 
are inversely related to the population of a municipality.  Consequently, if a municipality 
is divided in two, total grants to the two new municipalities can exceed the transfer that 
the old municipality received.  In this way, the Brazilian intergovernmental transfer 
system favours the division of existing municipalities into smaller units.  Whether the 
creation of new, smaller municipalities is a good or bad policy depends upon whether the 
number of existing municipalities is “optimal”.   
Relatively little has been written by economists on re-drawing the boundaries of 
municipal governments.  Epple and Romer (1989)  found that “detachments”, where 
boundaries are redrawn to exclude some land, were quite rare in the United States in the 
1970s, representing less than two percent of the total number of changes in municipal 
boundaries.   They noted that in the United States the institution rules permitting 
detachments vary from state to state, but most states have stringent regulations, such that 
“only undeveloped land at the boundary of a municipality is potentially eligible for 
detachment, and some form of collective approval is required in most states.” (p.318)   
The states with the highest rates of detachments were those where only a petition to a 
court or municipality was required 
  Carey, Srinivasan, and Strauss (1996) analyzed the consolidation of 
municipalities in Alleghany County Pennsylvania based on economies of scale in 
the production of public services.  They noted that “electors are much less likely to 
                                                 
1 Mendes and Boueri Miranada (2008, p.37).   2
support a consolidation plan if it may substantially change (for the worse) their 
existing local government tax levels or services” (p.117), and in their model they 
imposed “socio-economic” constraints on potential consolidations to reflect these 
political realities.   
More recently, a large literature has developed that addresses the question of the 
break-up and separation of nations.  Bolton and Roland (1997) have analyzed the 
incentives for separation for regions where individuals’ have different incomes.  Nations 
provide a private good, income redistribution, which can lead to the break-up of a country 
because some voters would like to have a level of redistribution that is closer to their 
preferred policy.  While the Bolton and Roland model has features that are also present in 
the model developed in this paper, their model applies to nation states and is concerned 
with issues, such as the free flow of capital, that are not central to the question municipal 
fragmentation. 
Our model is most closely related to Alesina and Spolaore (1996), who developed 
a model of the optimal number of governments when there is a trade-off between 
reductions in the per capita costs of providing a public good to a larger population and the 
increase in preference heterogeneity that occurs as the population of a jurisdiction 
increases.  They showed that the efficient number of governments is less than the “stable” 
number of governments, indicating that there is a tendency for democratic institutions to 
produce “too many governments”.   
As in Alesina and Spolaore (1996), we assume that the quality of a municipal 
service deteriorates with distance from the center of a municipality where the facility 
producing the service is located.  Individuals living in outlying regions of a municipality   3
may seek improvements in the quality of the public service they receive by voting in a 
referendum to form a new municipality which will reduce their distance from the facility.  
We use a utilitarian social welfare function to evaluate whether this democratic process 
will produce too many or too few municipalities.  
Our model differs from the Alesina and Spolaore model in one important respect.  
They assumed that the level of services, and therefore the expenditure by each 
government, is not affected by the number of governments.  In our model, the amount 
that the municipal government spends on the public service is determined by the median 
voter, and the preferred level of serive will, in general, change as the number of 
municipalities governments increases, the population of each municipality decreases, the 
marginal tax price for the public service increases, but the perceived quality of the public 
service increases.  Haimanko et al. (2004) and Bogomolnaia et al. (2008) also analyzed 
the efficient and stable number of governments when there are economies of scale in the 
provision of a public service and preference heterogeneity increases with the size of the 
population, but they also maintained Alesina and Spolaore’s assumption that the per 
government expenditure on the public service is not affected by the number of 
governments. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows.   
•  The cost of service deterioration with distance from a facility has to exceed the total 
cost of producing the public service for it to be socially desirable to split a 
municipality in two equal parts.   4
•  A sufficient condition for social welfare to decline when the M
th municipality is 
added to a region is that the ratio of service deterioration costs to production costs is 
less than or equal to M(M – 1). 
•  Equivalently, adding a municipality to a region reduces social welfare if the level of 
public service provided by each municipality declines. 
•  An expression for the upper-bound on the optimal number of municipalities in a 
region can be derived based on the ratio of service deterioration costs to production 
costs. 
•  A set of conditions exists whereby a majority of the population will favour dividing a 
municipality even though social welfare is reduced. 
•  In general, the model suggests that there may be an electoral bias in favour of creating 
too many municipalities.  Transfers to municipalities that are inversely related to 
population would only increase the incentive to create more municipalities, resulting 
in potentially greater social welfare losses. 
 
2.  The Provision of a Public Service in a Single Municipality 
Initially, we assume that one municipality covers the geographic area that is shown in 
Figure 1.  The population of the entire region is 2 units and has a uniform unit density.  
Individuals have a fixed point of residence in the region, and their location will be 
denoted by variable d, where -1 ≤ d ≤ 1.  (We will refer to 0 < d ≤ 1 as the R region and   
-1 ≤ d < 0 as the L region.)  The municipal government provides a public good from a 
facility that is located at the center of the geographic area.  The public service is non-  5
congestible, but the quality of the public service deteriorates as the distance from the 
facility increases.  We use the following utility function to describe preferences: 
f d g g
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where C is consumption of private goods, g is the level of the public service, and f is 
location of the facility.  Γ and γ are positive parameters representing preferences for the 
public service.  The δ parameter represents that rate at which the quality of the service 
deteriorates as the distance from the facility increases.  The marginal benefit curve, for a 
given level of g, is shown in Figure 1.  In particular, it is assumed that the marginal 
benefit from the public service,  g U MB ∂ ∂ = / , deteriorates as the distance from the 
facility  f d − increases.  Examples of such services where the marginal benefit 
deteriorates with distance from the facility are police and firefighting services. 
The level of the public service has a constant marginal cost of c, and there maybe 
a fixed cost F ≥ 0 associated with the facility as well.  The total cost of providing any 
given level of service, F + cg, is shared among all of the residents of the municipality.  
An individual’s budget constraint is therefore equal to Y = C + (F +cg)/2 where Y is the 
individual’s income, which is assumed to be the same for all residents.  The marginal “tax 
price” of a unit of the public service is 0.5c for all of the residents. 
  It is assumed that the level of service is determined by majority voting and that 
median level of service demanded will be the level provided by the municipal 
government.  Since all residents pay the same marginal tax price and the marginal benefit 
from the public service declines as distance from the facility increases, the median 
demand for the public service will be the amount that maximizes the utility function of 
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where g(1) indicates the median demand for the service when there is one municipality in 
the region.  The utility level that individuals achieve when one municipality provides the 
service is: 
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The individuals located at the center of the region have the highest utility and those 
located at the region’s boundaries will have the lowest utility because they receive the 
lowest quality of service. 
 
3.  The Decision to Divide a Municipality 
Now consider a proposal to split the region into two municipalities.  We assume that the 
new municipalities will be created only if a majority of the population in each of the 
proposed municipalities votes in favour of it in a referendum.  It is assumed that the 
boundary between the two new municipalities will be at 0 and the two new municipalities 
will locate their facilities at -0.5 and 0.5, i.e. at the centers of the new municipalities.  The 
public service levels provided by the new municipalities will also change because the 
median demands for public service will be those by individuals located at d = -0.75 and 
d = -0.25 in the L region and by individuals at d = 0.25 and d = 0.75 in the R region.  
While the median voter’s distance from the facility will reduced from 0.5 to 0.25, the 
marginal tax price for the public service will increase from 0.5c to c because the 
population of each new municipality is one unit.  The public service levels in the new 
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Therefore the level of service provided in the new municipalities will be higher than in 
the original municipality if and only if δ/c > 2.  That is, public service provision will be 
higher if and only if the rate at which services deteriorate with distance from the facility 
exceeds the twice marginal cost of providing a higher level of service.  The utility level 
that an individual can now achieve in R region with the new municipality is given below: 
[] 5 0 d 2 g 2 g
2
1
2 g 2 g c F Y 2 d U
2 . ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( − δ − γ − Γ + + − =     0 ≤ d ≤ 1  (5) 
(Given the symmetry of the regions, a similar expression will describe the well-being of 
individuals in the L region.  We will focus our discussion on the incentive to create the 
new municipality in the R region.)  First, note that everyone in the new municipality will 
have to pay higher taxes unless service levels decline by more than 50 percent.  In other 
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Figure 2 illustrates shows the utility levels of individuals in the R region with the 
new municipality, U(d, 2), and with one municipality U(d, 1).  The diagram illustrates the 
case where individuals located between d1 and d2 will be better off if the old municipality 
is split into two parts, where 0 < d1 < 0.5 and 0.5 < d2 ≤ 1.  If d2 – d1 > 0.5, a majority of 
the residents of R region are better off with the new municipality, and a referendum to 
create the new municipality would be approved.  Note that a necessary condition for 
referendum to pass is U(0.5, 2) > U(0.5, 1).  In other words, for the majority to be better 
off with the new municipality, the individuals located at the center of the new 
municipality must be better off.   8
Figure 3 shows a specific a case in which the referendum to split the municipality 
would be supported by the majority of the population in region R.  In this case δ/c = 1.5 
and F = 0, and the other parameter values were chosen such that in the initial situation 
one unit of the public service would be demanded and the tax price elasticity of demand 
is -0.50.
2  The solid line represents the utility levels attained when the entire region falls 
under one municipal government whereas the dashed line represents the utility levels of 
individuals in the R region with the creation of the new municipality.  All individuals 
from d1 = 0.425 to d2 = 1 are better off with the new municipality and therefore a 
majority of the population, 57.5 percent, would vote in favour of establishing the new 
municipality.  Note, however, 42.5 percent of the population would be worse off with the 
creation of the new municipality.  The parameter values adopted in this case are 
favourable for the creation of a new municipality.  With other parameter values, such as 
δ/c = 0.5 and F = 0, no one would be in favour of creating the new municipality. 
  Figure 3 illustrates a case where a majority of residents would favour the creation 
of a new municipality, even though their individual taxes would almost double, in order 
to receive a better quality of service.  The question arises whether the creation of the new 
municipality is “optimal” from a social perspective.  This is the topic that we turn to in 
the next section. 
 
4.  The Optimal Number of Municipalities 
To discuss the question of whether majority voting in referenda would produce 
the optimal number municipalities, we need to generalize the model to allow for M 
identical municipalities in the entire region.  We will focus our attention on the “right-
                                                 
2 The other parameter values are c = 1, γ = 1, Γ= 2.25.   9
most” municipality.  The population of a municipality is 2/M and its facility will be 
located at the point f(M) = (M – 1)/M.  The maximum distance that any individual is 
from the facility will be dmax(M) = 1/M.  The median voter (for public service provision) 
will be located at θ(M) = (2M – 1)/2M and his distance from the facility will be v(M) = 
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Therefore the change in the level of public services when we add an additional 
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If δ/c > M(M – 1), adding a municipality to the region will lead to an increase in the level 
of public services provided.  However, as we add more municipalities and divide the 
region into smaller and smaller units, the public service level will eventually decrease 
because the gain from improved quality of service (distance from the facility) will have a 
smaller impact on demand than the increased tax price for services due to the decline in 
the population of the municipality. 
  The utility level of an individual at point d (in the right-most municipality) will be 
equal to: 
) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) (
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  In order to discuss the “socially optimal number of municipalities” we need to 
specify the society’s goal or objective function.  There may be a variety of views about   10
what the criteria should be adopted for evaluating the provision of public services, 
including concerns about equality of access to public services.  In this paper, we will 
adopt a rather simple criterion—a utilitarian social welfare function—to evaluate the 
alternative levels of public services provided with different numbers of municipal 
governments, although we acknowledge that other criteria might be applied.  We adopt a 
utilitarian social welfare function because it seems appropriate in the context of the 
current model where it is assumed that everyone has the same income.  Thus the social 
welfare function is the following: 
[] [] ∫
δ
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where  ) (M U is the average utility achieved by a resident of the region.  The social gain 
or loss from adding the M
th municipality can be written as follows: 
[] []
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where the first term on the right-hand side is the gain from reducing the average distance 
to the facility by adding the M
th municipality, the second term is the cost of the services 
provided by the additional municipality, and the third term is the net social gain from the 
change in the level of services induced by adding an additional municipality, evaluated at 
the average service level with M and M – 1 municipalities.  Recall that the change in the 
level of service is given by (8) and that services will increase (decrease) if δ/c is greater 
than (less than) M(M – 1).     11
The analysis of the optimal number of municipalities is made more complex by 
the net social gain or loss from changes in the level of services provided as the number of 
municipalities increases.  Some insights into the issue can be gleaned if we assume g(M) 
= g(M – 1) = g, then M is the optimal number of municipalities if following conditions 
hold: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 M W M W 0 M W 1 M W − − < < − +     or: 
) ( ) ( 1 M M
cg F
g
1 M M + <
+
δ
< −         ( 1 2 )  
The integer that satisfies the above condition represents the optimal number of 
municipalities, assuming the level of the public service is fixed.  In particular, note that if 
δg/(F +cg) < 1, then it is optimal to have one municipality provide the service.  The 
model therefore indicates that the cost of service deterioration with distance from the 
facility has to exceed the total cost of producing the public good for it to be social optimal 
to split a municipality in two equal parts. 
Table 1 indicates optimal number of municipalities for different ranges of service 
deterioration costs relative to production costs, assuming a constant level of public 
service.   12
Table 1  
The Ratio of Service Deterioration Costs to Production Costs and the Optimal 
Number of Municipalities 
 










Optimal Number of Municipalities 
0 ≤ x ≤ 2  1 
2 < x ≤ 6  2 
6 < x ≤ 12  3 
12 < x ≤ 20  4 
 
It is also useful to note that the optimal number of municipalities (assuming constant 














     for δg/(F + cg) > 0.25, otherwise M = 1      (13) 
  The above approximations for the optimal number of municipalities are based on 
the assumption that the level of service remains constant as the number of municipalities 
increases.  However, this is a very dubious assumption because the marginal tax price 
that voters face will increase substantially when an additional municipality is added.  
Substituting (8) into (11) and using the median voters’ utility maximization conditions, 
the following equation can be derived with measures the net welfare gain from adding a 
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3 This is equivalent to the number of efficient governments per unit of distance that was derived by Alesina 
and Spolaore (1996).  Since the total length of the region in our model is twice as large as in the Alesina 
and Spolaore model, the optimal number of governments is twice as large as in their model.   13
Since the expression in square brackets is positive, a sufficient condition for social 
welfare to decline when an additional municipality is added is (δ/c) ≤ M(M – 1).  This 
implies that social welfare will decline if adding an additional municipality will reduce 
the level of service provided by each of the municipalities.  It also implies the following 
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Since the upper bound on the optimal number of municipalities in (15) exceeds the upper 
bound in (13), we conclude that allowing the provision of the service to vary can 
potentially increase the optimal number of municipalities.  The restriction in (15) also 
implies that if δ/c = 1.5, as in the numerical example shown in Figure 3, the optimal 
number of municipalities is less than 1.823.  In other words, the creation of two 
municipalities would reduce social welfare (as measured by the utilitarian social welfare 
function) even though it would be supported by a majority of the population.  The social 
welfare loss occurs in the case shown in Figure 3 because the area between the solid line 
and the dashed line to the left of d = 0.425 is greater than the area between the two curves 
to the right of that point. 
In general, the incentive to create a new municipality is strong because three 
quarters of the population of the new municipality will be closer to the facility.  This gain 
in the “quality of service” for these residents has to be balanced against their (likely) 
increase in taxes and the change in the level of services.  Note that the potential gains 
achieved by up to three quarters of the population come at the expense of one quarter of 
the population who will get a lower quality of service and (most likely) higher taxes.  
Thus situations arise where the majority of the population may receive a relatively small   14
per capita net benefit from creating a new municipality, even though it imposes a larger 
total loss on a minority of residents.  Indeed, it can be shown that a majority of the 
population will favour the creation of the two new municipalities, even though it results 
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In the situation portrayed in Figure 3, the above set of inequalities holds because the left-
hand side is -0.562, the middle term is 0.031, and the right-hand side is 0.406.  It seems 
unlikely that the above inequality could be reversed, i.e. where two municipalities are 
socially optimally, but a referendum on creating the new municipalities would be 
defeated.  Reversing the left-hand side inequality requires a high value for Γ, but this 
would increase the increase the right-hand side of the inequality by an even larger 
amount.  Thus, although we do not have a rigorous proof, it seems likely that there is a 
electoral bias in favour of creating too many municipalities even in the absence of 
population based transfers.  Transfers to municipalities that are inversely related to 
population would only increase the incentive to create more municipalities, resulting in 
potentially greater social welfare losses. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The main contribution of this paper has been to extend the Alesina and Spolare 
(1996) model to allow the level of public services to change when municipalities split up.  
Making the level of public services depend on the number of municipalities is realistic 
because voters in the new, smaller municipalities will see changes in the “quality” and the 
“tax price” of public services, and there is no reason to think that they would continue to   15
favour the same level of service.  Also, the identity of the median voter in the new 
municipality will change.  Allowing the level of the public service to vary in the Alesina-
Spolare model is important because our analysis shows that a reduction in the level of 
public service, following a democratic decision to divide a municipality, implies a 
reduction in social welfare.   
While this framework provides a basis for evaluating proposals to create more 
municipalities, it has a number of limitations.  For example, it ignores many important 
issues that arise in redrawing municipal boundaries, such as cross-boundary spillovers of 
municipal services and incentives to redraw boundaries based on geographic variations in 
municipal tax bases.  An interesting future direction for research would be to extend the 
model to incorporate these elements.  
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